Hoplon InfoSec
11 Oct, 2025
The idea that the thing you trust to protect your computer could be used against you is scary. Think of your antivirus as a guard who has been quietly paid off. It keeps the gate open at night so thieves can walk in and fill up a truck. That is not a story for a movie. Attackers use this trick to hide a malicious code virus inside the processes that are supposed to stop them.
Antivirus software has a lot of power. They are very deeply connected to the operating system. That access lets them scan files, stop suspicious behavior, and stop threats right away. But those same powers make them a tempting target. If someone can get bad code into an antivirus process, they can often get into the system without being noticed. Once inside, attackers can install a backdoor, steal credentials, or move laterally across a network, all while the security software seems to be doing its job.
Let me explain why this is happening now, how attackers do it, and what you can actually do to fight back.
Why antivirus processes are a big target
Administrators trust antivirus software, and that trust gives it a lot of power. That makes those steps appealing. In short, if you control the guard, you control the castle. Attackers don't want to fight the defense; they want to take it over.
Another reason is that it's complicated. Security suites for today are full of features. They have scanning engines, behavior monitors, cloud connectors, and a lot of other features. Bugs come with complexity. Those bugs can be small, hard to find, and easy to miss, but if an attacker knows where to look, they can also be openings. Add attackers who are always looking for weaknesses, and they will show up.
Finally, the risks are high. If an attacker can hide a virus with malicious code inside a security process, it can often get past other defenses without being found. That lets them stay in place, steal secrets, or plan a bigger attack without anyone noticing.
How attackers put bad code into antivirus programs
There are a few common methods, but they change as defenders get better at them. One way is to take advantage of a flaw in the antivirus program itself. These are real bugs in the software that can let someone outside of the program write code into the memory or load a bad module. At that point, the attacker is basically running inside the security product.
Another way is to get a privileged process to do the dirty work for them. This could mean using the operating system's built-in debugging, dump, or crash-handling tools in a bad way. If an attacker can get those utilities to load or run code in the context of the antivirus, it will look real to other system monitors.
Social engineering is another thing. A targeted email, a convincing installer, or a hacked update mechanism can get a user or admin to give access. When a bad installer runs with high permissions, it can change how an antivirus works. Not every time is it about a zero-day exploit; sometimes it's about getting something that is supposed to be safe to do things that are not safe.
What an antivirus process that has been infected can do
Think about what the attacker wants. Access that is quiet often lasts. Attackers can hide files, intercept telemetry, or stop other tools from seeing what they're doing if they put code inside an antivirus process. That's how a virus with bad code turns into a backdoor.
After that, the attacker has choices. They can take your login information and use it to get into other systems. They can put ransomware modules on your computer or steal your customers' information. They can set up scheduled tasks or backdoor listeners that call home whenever the attacker wants. Because the infection is in a trusted process, normal alerts might not go off.
Examples from the real world that make this real
There are documented cases of people using real system tools to hurt security software. Researchers used a Windows tool to trick security software into loading harmful modules in a well-known case. In another case, bugs in an endpoint product let code run in the security context. These are not just thought experiments. They show that the pattern works and, even more importantly, can be repeated.
It feels personal to hear about hacks like this because they go against what we think is safe. Organizations that depend on a single control for safety suddenly realize that the control can be turned into a weapon. Don't panic is the lesson. To protect against a wider range of threats, you should assume that any one part could one day be a vector.
How to find this kind of breach
Finding it is hard, but not impossible. Watch for actions that don't fit with how things normally work. If an antivirus process is starting strange child processes, writing files that it shouldn't, or making network connections that it shouldn't, those are signs that something is wrong.
It can also help to keep an eye on API calls. Calling low-level functions that write to memory, load modules, or make dumps can be a sign of abuse. Even so, experienced attackers try to make their actions look like normal behavior, so finding them often means looking at multiple signals and the timeline.
A useful tip: keep an eye out for gaps between telemetry and activity. If other endpoint monitoring shows activity that the antivirus doesn't, that difference is suspicious. To put it simply, detection is about more than just one alert.
Steps to quickly fix problems and make things stronger
Make sure your security tools are up to date first. Vendors fix known security holes, and staying up-to-date lowers your risk. That's just basic hygiene, but it matters.
Next, turn on the features that protect against tampering. Many modern endpoint products have settings that stop changes to their files, services, and registries unless they are made from a central console. Turn those on and keep a close eye on who has access to them.
Only let certain people use native debugging or dump tools. Limit those features if only a few administrators really need them. Attackers often take advantage of wide permissions, so it's helpful to narrow them down.
You should also think about defense in depth. Network segmentation, least privilege, and strong credential management make it hard for an attacker to move around your environment even if one host is hacked. Lastly, add monitoring tools that can watch how the system works without the antivirus program. With those extra eyes, it's easier to spot the small signs of bad behavior.
Why having a long-term plan is important
Short-term fixes can stop a problem right away, but a long-term plan is what keeps businesses strong. That includes threat hunting routines, regular drills for responding to incidents, and a plan for what to do if a trusted process is thought to be compromised.
It also means making vendors be open and quick to fix things. When a vulnerability is found, the time between when it is made public and when a patch is released is very important. Companies should have ways to quickly and safely test and apply these updates.
A last word to the defenders
It's hard to accept that a protector can help attackers. Still, the first step to better security is to accept that possibility. Think of endpoint protection as one important part of a bigger picture. You can use it, but don't depend on it alone. Put technical controls together with careful policy, user education, and constant monitoring.
If you remember one thing from this talk, let it be this: being careful is more important than being sure. Keep asking yourself if an alert is real or if the silence is hiding something. That habit will save time and, in some cases, whole systems.
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